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Recent Developments

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND v. CULVER:

Attorney's Sexual Relationship with his Client Violated the
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct
By: Brian Casto
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that an attorney's
sexual relationship with his client violated the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct ("MRPC"). Att'y Grievance Comm'n of Md. v.
Culver, 381 Md. 241, 849 A.2d 423 (2004). In so holding, the court
relied primarily on language it recently added to the Comments to the
MRPC. Id. at 268-69, 849 A.2d at 440.
Client (opinion does not disclose client's identity) retained
Allan J. Culver, Jr. ("Culver") to represent her in a divorce action in
March 1993. On the evening of September 9, 1993, following a
hearing earlier in the day, Culver arrived unexpectedly at Client's
home. Client allowed Culver into her home on the premise that he
needed to inspect the condition of the house to prepare a response to
an allegation asserted by Client's estranged husband.
Culver
eventually led Client to the basement of her home where he
physically forced Client to have sexual intercourse with him.
According to Client, during two subsequent meetings with Culver at
his office, Culver induced Client to perform oral sex on him. Client
conceded at the disciplinary hearing that these two events were
consensual. Client, fearing that revealing Culver's conduct would
cause her to lose custody of her children, continued to be represented
by him throughout her divorce proceedings and her appeal. Culver
withdrew his representation of Client after receipt of his fee for her
appeal. Subsequently, Culver did not refund the fees paid and she
retained an attorney to institute a civil claim against Culver for legal
malpractice and forcible sexual contact.
Bar Counsel subsequently filed a Petition for Disciplinary
Action against Culver for various violations of the MRPC. The court
of appeals referred the matter to a judge in the Circuit Court for
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Baltimore County for an evidentiary hearing, and proposed
conclusions of law. At the close of the hearing, the circuit court judge
found Culver in violation of numerous Rules, including MRPC 1.7
and 8.4, for his sexual relationship with Client. The court of appeals
then reviewed the circuit court judge's finding de novo.
The court of appeals looked first at the circuit court judge's
finding that Culver violated MRPC 1.7 and 8.4 by engaging in a
sexual relationship with Client. Id. The court agreed with the hearing
judge's conclusion that the sexual encounters between Culver and
Client were non-consensual because of their "exploitative and
coercive" nature. Id. at 267, 849 A.2d at 438. In reaching this
conclusion, the court noted that there was no relation between a
finding of non-consensual sexual activity for purposes of an attorney
disciplinary proceeding and the relation necessary to sustain criminal
charges. Id. at n. 12.
The court next discussed recent developments in the field of
attorney ethical rules that resulted from an amendment of the
American Bar Association's Model Rules. Id. at 267-68, 849 A.2d at
438-39. The revised Model Rules include a black-letter prohibition on
attorney-client sexual relationships. Id. at 267, 849 A.2d at 439. The
court noted that this Rule has not been unanimously adopted by the
states. Id. at 268, 849 A.2d at 439.
The court observed that Maryland considered, but rejected,
adopting the black-letter prohibition on attorney-client sexual
relationships in its Rules. Id. at 269 n.15, 849 A.2d at 440. Thus, the
MRPC contains no black-letter restriction on attorney-client sexual
relationships. Id. at 269, 849 A.2d at 440. Instead, the MRPC relies on
language in the Comments to construe MRPC 1.7 and 8.4 to
encompass sexual relationships between attorneys and their clients.
Id. at 269-70, 849 A.2d at 440.
The Comment to MRPC 1.7 explains that a sexual relationship
between an attorney and client creates an impermissible conflict when
"the representation of the client would be materially limited by the
sexual relationship." Id. at 269, 849 A.2d at 440 (quoting MRPC 1.7
cmt.). The Comment to MRPC 8.4 adds that "sexual harassment
involving . . . clients . . . may violate paragraph (d)[,]" which
precludes "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice." Id.
(quoting MRPC 8.4 & cmt.). Without analyzing whether Culver's
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conduct actually limited the representation of Client or constituted
sexual harassment, the court found Culver in violation of both MRPC
1.7 and 8.4. Id. at 269-70, 849 A.2d at 440.
The court found support for its conclusion in a Louisiana
opinion stating that a black-letter rule prohibiting conduct similar to
Culver's is not necessary to find a violation of MRPC 1.7 and 8.4. Id.
(citing In re Ashy, 721 So.2d 859, 864 (La. 1998)). Further, the court
found that the Arizona Supreme Court deemed that any unwanted
sexual advances violated MRPC 1.7. Id. (citing In re Piatt, 951 P.2d
889,891 (Az. 1997)). Finally, the court pointed to an Indiana decision
holding that a sexual relationship between attorney and client violates
MRPC 1.7. Id. (citing In re Grimm, 674 N.E.2d 551, 554 (Ind. 1996)).
Based on its analysis of the relevant case law, the court opined that
although "approaches" to dealing with attorney-client sexual
relations may vary from state-to-state, it is unquestionable that
exploitative sexual advances by an attorney are in violation of the
disciplinary rules. Culver, 381 Md. at 271, 849 A.2d at 441.
The court further noted that a sexual relationship between an
attorney and his or her domestic relations client creates an "inherent
conflict in violation of Rule 1.7." Id. at 272, 849 A.2d at 442. The court
recognized that an attorney-client sexual relationship in the context of
a divorce proceeding would likely impede the execution of the client's
case. Id. at 274,849 A,2d at 443. For instance, the opposing spouse in
a divorce proceeding may gain an advantage should an attorneyId.
Also, the
client sexual relationship constituted adultery.
relationship may result in the attorney becoming a witness to the
action. Id. Thus, an attorney-client sexual relationship, in the context
of a domestic proceeding, is a per se violation of Rule 1.7. Id. at 275,
849 A.2d at 443.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held an attorney's sexual
relationship with his client violates the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct. The Rule is simple, yet the method by which it
is derived, at least with respect to MRPC 8.4, is troublesome. In an
attempt to govern attorney conduct, while allowing ample room for
judicial discretion, the court of appeals relies heavily on the nonauthoritative Comments to the MRPc. Such reliance leads one to
consider the actual weight of the Comments. It leaves open the
question of whether they are merely guides to interpretation, as
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indicated by the Preamble to the Rules, or whether they should be
heeded with the same respect as the black-letter law. Until the court
of appeals conclusively answers this question, attorneys will be left to
guess the effect of future amendments to the Comments.
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